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By Louis  KAPLOW  * 
Voluntary transfers  between individuals are 
potentially subject to income taxes and wealth 
transfer  (estate and gift) taxes. With regard  to 
the income tax, Henry Simons (1938)  argued 
that it  should be  levied  both on  the donor, 
whose gift is a form of personal consumption, 
and on the donee, who directly consumes the 
gift. Others  would limit income taxation  to the 
donee, the only one whose act of consumption 
dissipates real resources. Most income tax sys- 
tems do tax gifts only once, but the single tax 
is  imposed in  a different, more administra- 
tively  convenient  manner:  the  donee  is 
exempt, and instead the donor is taxed, im- 
plicitly,  by  not  allowing  any deduction for 
gifts. Yet the rationale  for simply applying the 
labor  income  tax  rate -  whether  once  or 
twice-to  gifts is dubious because, as I will 
discuss, the incentive, distributive, and other 
welfare effects  of  taxing gifts and of  taxing 
labor income are different. 
Wealth transfer  taxes, which in most devel- 
oped countries are levied only on the estates 
of wealthy individuals, are often evaluated in 
terms of their redistributive  effects. But such 
analysis is not usually integrated with that of 
the income tax, which is also a redistributive 
tool. Another factor suggesting the need for a 
more integrated  treatment  of transfer  taxes and 
income taxation is that the effects of taxation 
on behavior and welfare will  depend on the 
aggregate of taxes levied on a gift rather  than 
on what portion of the tax is designated as a 
gift or estate tax and what portion is deemed 
to be an aspect of the income tax. 
Accordingly, this paper considers a single, 
unified framework  for analyzing the combined 
taxation of gifts, one that incorporates  existing 
analysis  of  redistributive income  taxation.' 
Using such an approach, I sketch a mapping 
between types of gifts and optimal tax policy. 
It is helpful, however, to begin by discussing 
how gifts should be taxed if they were simply 
another  form of ordinary  consumption. 
I. Gifts  as a Form  of Ordinary  Consumption 
A.  Separability of Redistribution 
The approach  here is to begin with the stan- 
dard optimal labor income tax problem in a 
world with no gifts and then to examine how 
that tax should be altered in the presence of 
gifts. Interestingly, under such a formulation 
of the transfer  taxation question, redistribution 
becomes largely a separate issue. The reason 
is that redistribution  is accomplished directly, 
by adjusting the tax schedule as a function of 
income.  The transfer taxation  problem  in- 
volves determining  whether, say, parents who 
give an above-average fraction of their  income 
to their children should be taxed more or less 
relative to other parents at the same income 
level who instead spend a greater fraction of 
their income on themselves. 
This  preliminary study will  not  formally 
model this rather  complicated optimal income 
tax problem. To gain some initial insights, it 
is useful to undertake a simpler thought ex- 
periment. Suppose that, at each level  of  in- 
come  for  donors,  more  (less)  generous 
treatment of  gifts  is  achieved  by lowering 
(raising) the tax rate applicable to income ex- 
pended on gifts and raising (lowering) the tax 
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rate applicable to income expended on direct 
consumption, that is, labor income net of any 
gifts made. For example, a gift subsidy could 
be understood as a tax credit for gifts com- 
bined with a higher labor income tax rate, so 
that the  tax on  donors'  direct consumption 
would be higher and the net burden on gifts 
would be lower than under a uniform system. 
One can thus hold the total tax burden  on each 
income class constant. (Although this may not 
be optimal, the approach  focuses attention on 
the treatment  of gifts relative to that of direct 
consumption.) 
B.  Optimal  Relative Taxation of Gifts 
and Ordinary Consumption 
As a benchmark,  it is efficient  to tax individ- 
uals' expenditures  on different  goods and  services 
in the same manner  (i.e., there  would not be dif- 
ferential  commodity  taxation) when there is an 
income  tax. The standard  qualification  is that  tax- 
ing more heavily (lightly) expenditures  on com- 
modities  that  make leisure  relatively  more (less) 
attractive  would  lessen the  labor/leisure  distortion 
caused by income taxation  (see A. B. Atkinson 
and Joseph Stiglitz, 1976).2  Thus, viewing gifts 
for the moment as simply another  form of con- 
sumption, it is  efficient to tax them relatively 
more heavily if, say, donors need more leisure 
time to enjoy  their  utility  from  giving (such as by 
spending  time with the children  whom they sup- 
port) than  to enjoy other  forms of consumption. 
On the other  hand,  it is efficient  to tax gifts more 
lightly  if, for example,  much of the enjoyment  is 
vicarious,  deriving  from  contemplation  of the  gift. 
With bequests  in particular,  a donor may work 
harder  in order  to leave a larger  bequest,  whereas 
workers  who instead  spend  their  earnings  on va- 
cations  would need more leisure  time. The ques- 
tion of whether  it is efficient  to tax or to subsidize 
gifts, viewed as another  form of ordinary  con- 
sumption,  is an empirical  one that  has not, to my 
knowledge,  been investigated. 
C.  How Gifts May Differ 
The remainder of this paper will focus on 
the manner  in which gifts differ fundamentally 
from ordinary  personal consumption: making 
a gift does not expend real resources, but in- 
stead shifts them to another  individual.3  I will 
now explore the implications of this difference 
and how they depend on the type of gift that 
is involved. 
IL Altruism 
A.  Positive Externality on Donees 
Gifts convey  a sort of positive externality 
on donees.4 To see this, consider the case of 
an altruistic donor who equally values the di- 
rect utility from his own consumption and the 
donee's utility from her own consumption: 
U(x, y, g)  u(x  -  g)  + v(y  + g) 
where g is the amount of the donor's gift, x 
and y are the donor's and donee's pretransfer 
incomes,  and u(  )  and v(  ),  assumed to be 
strictly concave, are the donor's and donee's 
utilities  from their own consumption.'  Ob- 
serve that the donor counts the benefit to the 
donee as it enters the donor'  s own utility func- 
tion,  whereas  a social  welfare  assessment 
should also weigh in the benefit to the donee. 
Thus, under a utilitarian social welfare func- 
tion,  W(x,  y,  g)  =  u(x  -  g)  +  2v(y  +  g). 
This discrepancy between the donor's and so- 
ciety's  objectives suggests that treating gifts 
more generously than own consumption and, 
hence, a gift subsidy might be optimal. 
To explore this point, consider the following 
formulation of the donor's utility function: 
U(x,  y,  g) 
=  au(x  -  (1  -  s)g  -  t)  +  f3v(y  +  g) 
where a and ,B  are the weights that the donor 
gives to the direct utility from his own con- 
2 Other qualifications will not be explored here. 
' It is also relevant that gifts may involve a sort of vol- 
untary redistribution,  such as in the case of intergenera- 
tional transfers  when there is regression toward the mean 
in earnings ability (see  e.g.,  D.  L. Bevan  and Stiglitz, 
1979). 
4  This  idea has been noted by Atkinson ( 1971 ), among 
others, and is developed in Kaplow (1995). 
5 This is a special case of the model introduced  in Gary 
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sumption and to the donee's utility from her 
own consumption, s is a subsidy on gifts, and 
t is a tax (taken as given by the donor) that 
the government  collects in order  to finance the 
subsidy. 
Now, consider the effects of marginally in- 
creasing s, beginning at s = 0. First, this will 
induce the donor to increase his gift. This can 
be seen from the donor's first-order  condition: 
a(l  -  s)u'(x  -  (1  -  s)g  -  t) 
= f3v'(y + g). 
Raising s (and also increasing t to finance the 
increase in s) will, at a given level of g, reduce 
the value of the left side; to restore equality, g 
must increase, given  the strict concavity of 
u (  ) and v (  )  .6 As a consequence, the donee' s 
utility will increase. Moreover, at s = 0, it can 
be shown that  there will be no first-order  effect 
on the donor's utility.7  Finally, the donor's net 
position vis-a-vis the government also is un- 
changed because the increase in the subsidy 
on gifts is financed by taxing donors. In sum, 
a slight increase in the subsidy will help the 
donee at no cost to the donor or the treasury. 
B.  Externality  with Respect to Labor Income 
Tax Revenue 
When considering possible tax-revenue ef- 
fects  in  a world  with  a labor  income  tax 
(which  is not explicitly modeled here),  it is 
appropriate  to  take  into  account  possible 
changes in labor supply. For donors, a small 
change in s, beginning at s = 0, will have no 
direct labor-supply  effect: because the donor'  s 
utility remains the same for any given level of 
earned  income,  the  choice  of  labor effort 
would be unaffected.8  (There is, of course, the 
qualification noted previously for the case in 
which changing the donor's allocation of in- 
come  between  gifts  and own  consumption 
changes the relative value of leisure.) 
Gifts may, however, result in a tax-revenue 
externality  because  they  augment  donees' 
income. In conventional analyses, this exter- 
nality would be negative: donees would work 
less  because  of  the income  effect  and thus 
would pay less income tax. To combat this ex- 
ternality, one  could tax donees  on  ithe gifts 
they receive  (or,  equivalently,  tax donors' 
gifts more heavily). 
There are, however,  other considerations. 
Gifts  to donees  might  relax  liquidity  con- 
straints  that otherwise limit investments in hu- 
man capital or entrepreneurship  (see Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin et al.,  1994).  The net long-run 
effect of such gifts may be to increase donees' 
earnings and thus donees' tax payments, cre- 
ating a positive tax-revenue externality. And 
there may be strategic  effects that would influ- 
ence  donees'  earnings and, thereby, the in- 
come taxes they pay: donees might choose to 
earn less, knowing that their plight will induce 
altruistic donors to give more (the  "Samari- 
tan's dilemma"),  or donees might undertake 
activities that increase their income because 
donors might promise future  gifts thali  are con- 
ditional on such behavior. 
C.  Gifts' Effects on Donors' and Donees' 
Marginal Utility 
Many models of altruism  assume that 
U(x,  y, g)  =  u(x  -  g)  + fv(y  + g). 
That is, a  =  1 and 3 >  0. First, consider how 
the marginal utility of consumption of donors 
compares to that of nondonors. Donors, as a 
consequence of their  giving, would have lower 
6 Differentiating the first-order  condition with respect 
to s, where t = gs,  yields 
dg  -au'  > 0. 
ds  a(1-  s)u" +  3v' 
The derivative is 
dU=  g'(-a  s)u'  + Ov'  asu').  ds 
On the right side, the first two terms in parentheses,  taken 
together, equal zero (from the donor's first-order  condi- 
tion),  and the third term is zero at s = 0. 
' At s > 0, the induced  increase in g reduces the donor's 
own consumption and thereby raises his marginal utility 
of  consumption; ceteris paribus, this would tend to in- 
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own consumption  than  would nondonors  at the 
same income level. As a result, donors would 
have a higher marginal utility of income than 
would nondonors who had identical functions 
u(  )  for utility of  own  consumption. (This 
case  might arise, for example, when donors 
differ from nondonors only in that the former 
are fortunate  enough to have found compatible 
mates or to have had children  who please them 
sufficiently to induce giving.) In maximizing 
a utilitarian social welfare function, this dif- 
ference  in  marginal utilities  would  warrant 
more favorable tax treatment  of donors.9 
Now suppose instead that donors are not in- 
dividuals who place an unusually high value 
on  others' well-being,  but instead are those 
who  derive unusually low  utility from their 
own consumption;  that is, their a is much less 
than 1 (even though, perhaps,  still greater  than 
,i).  Then, in spite of donors' lower consump- 
tion, their marginal  utility might be lower than 
that of nondonors  whose utility from own con- 
sumption  was given by u (  ), which would jus- 
tify less favorable treatment  under a utilitarian 
social welfare function. 
Distinguishing  these  two  cases  requires 
making interpersonal  utility comparisons. (A 
donor's observable behavior depends only on 
a/,l  and not on the absolute magnitude of a 
and ,B.) Analysts often elude this problem by 
stipulating that all individuals have the same 
utility function, but this assumption cannot be 
maintained  in the present context because it is 
inconsistent with the heterogeneity in the be- 
havior that is under consideration-namely, 
some individuals are donors and others are  not. 
Hence, judgments about transfer policy, like 
judgments about general redistribution  policy, 
must to some extent reflect views  about dif- 
ferent individuals' utility functions that  cannot 
be grounded in observable behavior. 
Another factor is  that donees'  own  con- 
sumption will be higher than otherwise on ac- 
count  of  the  gifts  that they  receive.  This 
implies that their marginal utility of income 
will be lower than that of individuals with the 
same earned income who do not receive gifts, 
which favors heavier taxation of donees (tan- 
tamount to heavier taxation of gifts).  Never- 
theless, it remains true that, abstracting  from 
possible  tax-revenue externalities, it will  be 
optimal for objects of  altruism (prospective 
donees) to receive more effective income and 
thus have a lower marginal utility of income 
than others because their  utility from own con- 
sumption receives  additional weight  in the 
social  welfare  function  due  to  altruists' 
concerns. 
III. Utility  from  Giving  Per Se 
Some donors may care only about the gifts 
that they themselves  make, motivated by  a 
need for self-sacrifice or a desire for prestige, 
as in James Andreoni (1990).  Let 
U(x,g)=u(x-(I  -s)g--t,g). 
Analysis of this case, it turns out, is virtually 
the same as for altruism. It can be shown that 
introducing a positive subsidy will induce the 
donor to give a larger gross gift, and that this 
will increase the utility of the donee without 
reducing the donor's utility (at s  = 0). 1  Tax- 
revenue effects and other factors will be anal- 
ogous as well. 
The preceding formulation may, however, 
be inappropriate.  If the donor really is moti- 
'Different  social welfare functions may have qualita- 
tively different implications. For example, under a maxi- 
min function, such altruistic donors are better off  than 
others on account of their altruistic preferences and thus 
should be taxed more heavily (as should donees, who are 
better off on account of receiving altruists' gifts). 
'?The donor's first-order  condition is now 
(1  -  s)u  =  U2 
where a subscript i denotes the derivative with respect to 
the ith argument.  Differentiating this condition yields 
dg  uj 
ds  (1  -  S  -  (1  -)U12-21  +  U22 
The numerator  is negative, and from the second-order  con- 
dition, the denominator  is negative, so dg/ds >  0. Finally, 
dU=g  P( (ls)uI  +U2  su). 
ds 
Again, the first two terms in parentheses  on the right side, 
taken together, equal zero (from the donor's first-order 
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vated in a manner that depends on his own 
sacrifice and not on the gross gain to the donee 
from all sources (as with the altruist), then it 
seems  reasonable  that the  donor's  benefit 
should not depend on the gross gift, g,  as in 
the preceding model, but rather on  the net 
amount that he himself gives up, (1  -  s) g. 
Accordingly, consider 
U(x,  g)  =  u(x  -  (1  -  s)g  -  t,  (1  -  s)g). 
In this case, the effect of a gift subsidy on so- 
cial welfare is quite different:  raising s directly 
reduces the donor's utility because he benefits 
only from his own sacrifice, (1  -  s)g,  which 
is reduced as s is increased. It tums out that 
when a subsidy induces the donor to increase 
his gift, he is in essence redistributing  his own 
income to the donee; unlike the previous cases, 
here a higher gross gift induced by a subsidy 
produces a utility benefit to the donee but a 
utility loss to the donor (even at s = 0).12 The 
limited empirical work on this transfer  motive 
has not sought to distinguish between these 
two different formulations. 
IV. Exchange 
If donors' gifts are in exchange for donees' 
efforts (see  Douglas Bernheim et al.,  1985; 
Donald Cox, 1987), the transaction  really con- 
sists of ordinary  consumption  by the donor and 
labor income earned by the donee, and each 
component should be  taxed  accordingly. A 
different form of exchange arises when trans- 
fers actually are loans (or loan repaynments)  or 
elements of various forms of insurance  and an- 
nuity schemes  (see  Laurence Kotlikoff  and 
Avia Spivak, 1981).  In such cases, payments 
in both directions would generally be exempt 
from taxation. 
Other posited  transfer behavior  has  ele- 
ments of exchange. Oded Stark and Ita Falk 
(1998)  suggest  that individuals  may make 
gifts to engender gratitude in recipients, who 
may later return  the favor. In this case, one of 
the preceding types of exchange may be pres- 
ent, depending upon whether the initial gifts 
or later "repayments" comprise labor effort. 
James Buchanan (1983)  claims that potential 
donees will engage in rent-seeking  behavior  to 
elicit gifts from prospective donors, in which 
case perhaps gifts should be taxed, if donees' 
efforts to induce gift-giving waste resources. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper offers a framework  for assessing 
tax policy  with  regard to  private voluntary 
transfers  to individuals. The main elements are 
integrating  the income tax and estate/gift tax's 
treatment  of gifts, taking a unified view of the 
distributive  problem  in  the  context  of  an 
optimal income tax framework, and focusing 
on aspects of gifts that distinguish them from 
donors' ordinary  consumption. 
The present analysis reveals that  the optimal 
tax treatment  of gifts (relative to the tax treat- 
ment applicable to labor income that is  ex- 
pended on  direct consumption for  oneself) 
is  extremely  sensitive  to  the  type  of  gift 
involved: 
(i)  Altruism.  -Gifts  involve a positive ex- 
ternality on donees, which favors a sub- 
sidy;  there may  also  be  a  positive  or 
negative tax-revenue externality, and do- 
nors may have higher or lower marginal 
utility than others, which tends to favor 
a larger subsidy or a smaller subsidy (or 
a tax),  as the case may be. 
(ii)  Utility from  giving  per  se. --This  is 
" To dramatize  the point further,  suppose that the sub- 
sidy was not paid to donors, but instead was administered 
in the financially equivalent form of a matching grant  paid 
directly to donees. (Note  that an assumption implicit in 
both formulations  is that donors do not derive utility from 
paying taxes, even if  those taxes are used to subsidize 
gifts.) 
2 The donor's first-order condition is  now  ul  =  u2. 
From this, one can derive: 
dg  -gu12  +  gu22 
ds  ull  -  (1 -  S)U2-  U21 +  (  -  S)U22 
Observe that dglds  may not be positive. (It will be unless 
u12 is sufficiently negative.) Finally, 
dU  -  = 
g'(-u,  +  u2 -  SU2)  -  gu2- 
ds 
Again, the first two terms in parentheses  on the right side, 
taken together, equal zero (from the donor's first-order 
condition),  and the third term is zero at s  =  0. But now 
there is the additional term, which is negative even at s = 
0. 288  ABA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS  MAY 1998 
similar to altruism if the donor's utility 
depends on the gross gift (i.e., including 
the subsidy), but there is no positive gift 
externality if the donor's utility depends 
on the gift net of the subsidy. 
(iii)  Exchange.  -If  a gift is really compen- 
sation in exchange for labor, the "gift" 
should be taxed as part of labor income; 
if the exchange is financial (such as with 
loans  and repayments or insurance ar- 
rangements), no tax or subsidy is appro- 
priate; if  gifts  are induced by wasteful 
rent-seeking, a tax may be optimal.1" 
These results indicate the policy relevance 
of  further empirical work that distinguishes 
among transfer motives  and identifies more 
precisely the form of donors' utility functions. 
Because  transfer  motives  no  doubt  vary 
greatly among donors, and in ways that the 
government cannot readily observe, it may be 
necessary to adopt tax policies based upon av- 
erage behavior or to employ some simple cat- 
egorical rules that,  perhaps,  distinguish among 
gifts  between  spouses,  transfers to descen- 
dants, and contributions to  public charities, 
based upon the typical characteristics  of each 
class of gifts.14 
'3  Note  also  that purely accidental  bequests  (when 
individuals  cannot annuitize),  which  were not exam- 
ined here, might optimally  be  subject to confiscatory 
taxation. 
'4  Such  distinctions  are made  in  current regimes 
(e.g.,  in rules defining the tax and welfare treatment of 
various family  units),  although existing  rules are not 
well  rationalized  in  terms of  the general  distributive 
objectives  of  the tax system  or the motives  likely  to 
govern sharing (transfers) within the family. For an ini- 
tial study of this problem, see Kaplow (1996). 
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